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The present paper seeks to investigate the importance of financial instability during four 
banking crises, with focus on the small open economy of Norway. The crises elaborated 
on are the Post First world war crisis of the early 1920s, the mid 1920s Monetary crisis, 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Scandinavian banking crisis of 1987-1993.  
 
The paper firstly offers a brief description of the financial instability hypothesis as applied 
by Minsky, Kindleberger, and in a new explicit dynamic financial crisis model. Financial 
instability creation basically happens in times of overheating, overspending and over 
lending, i.e., during significant booms, and have devastating effects after markets have 
turned into a state of crises. 
 
Thereafter, the paper tests the validity of the financial instability hypothesis by using a 
quantitative structural time series model. The test reveals upheaval of financial and 
macroeconomic indicators prior to the crises, making the economy overheat and create 
asset bubbles due to huge growth in debt. These conditions caused the following banking 
crises.  
 
Finally, the four crises are discussed qualitatively. The conclusion is that significant 
increase in money supply and debt caused overheating, asset bubbles and finally financial 
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The present paper examines four financial crises in the mirror of the financial instability 
hypothesis promoted by Minsky and Kindleberger. They argue that loss of financial 
stability might lead to overheating of the economy, with huge debt and thereafter financial 
crises as consequences. 
 
More precisely, the paper uses a Minsky-Kindleberger inspired explicit seven-step 
dynamic model for financial crises by Grytten and Hunnes as a framework for examining 
four banking crises in the small open economy of Norway. The crises under investigation 
are: 
 
1. The Post-First world war depression in the early 1920s 
2. The Monetary crisis in the mid-1920s 
3. The Great Depression in the 1930s 
4. The Scandinavian banking crisis 1987-1993 
 
The paper firstly gives brief definitions of key terms used in its analysis. Thereafter it 
discusses the theoretical framework of the analysis, i.e., how financial instability may pave 
the way for financial crises by gearing, overheating, and thereafter contraction. Thirdly, 
the paper discusses the financial development of markets and the macro economy, 
evolving into financial instability creation, causing overheating and crises. Thus, each 
crisis and their foreplays are discussed and examined by looking at relevant 
macroeconomic indicators. The development is then used to examine to what extent the 
financial instability hypothesis as described in Minsky-Kindleberger inspired seven-step 
dynamic model for financial crises might explain the empirical development of crises.  
 
Literature 
There is no common definition of financial crisis. However, most scholars do agree on 
certain characteristics. Claessens and Kose state that financial crises often revolve around 
four parameters:1 
 
1. Significant fall in credit volumes and prices of assets 
2. Disruption of external financing and financial intermediation 
3. Negative asset balances 
4. Need of substantial financial support from governments  
This paper recognizes these characteristics and defines financial crises as incidents where 
financial institutions are not able to provide necessary means of payment, due to heavy 
losses. Goldsmith defines financial crises as “sharp, brief, ultra-cyclical deterioration of 
almost all financial indicators, short-term interest rates, asset prices, commercial 
insolvencies and failure of financial institutions”.2 
                                                     
1 Stijn Claessens and M. Ayhan Kose, Financial Crises Explanations, Types, and Implications (IMF Working 
Papers, 2013) 13/28. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Financial-Crises-
Explanations-Types-and-Implications 
2 Raymond W. Goldsmith, Comment on Hyman P Minsky. The Financial Instability Hypothesis. In 
Charles P. Kindleberger and Jean-Pierre Laffargue (eds.), Financial Crises, Theory, History and Policy 






Banks constitute the core of a financial system and until the mid 1900s, financial crises 
were often considered equivalent to credit crunches and bank crises. The paper’s 
definition of a bank crisis is that the bank industry is unable to solve its duties by 
providing sufficient credit to the economy, due to heavy financial losses. Hence, bank 
crises occur when negative shocks in financial markets are causing lack of credit to the 
economy. 
 
There are several definitions of financial stability. Most of them stress that financial stability 
is about the absence of system-wide episodes when the financial system fails to function and 
about resilience of financial systems to stress. 
A stable financial system will efficiently allocate resources and manage financial risks, 
maintain employment close to the natural rate, and eliminate relative price movements of 
real and financial assets that will affect monetary stability or employment levels. A financial 
system is stable when it dissipates financial imbalances caused by exogenous and 
endogenous factors. It will absorb shocks primarily via self-corrective mechanisms, 
preventing disruptive effects on the financial system or the real economy  
Financial instability is the opposite to financial stability. During financial instability, 
financial institutions may either be too eager or too reluctant to finance projects, asset 
prices may deviate significantly from their fundamental values, and markets could either 
overflow or dry out of liquidity. Significant instability may lead to bank runs, high general or 
asset inflation, or the opposite, i.e., market crashes with rapidly falling asset prices. This may 
severely undermine confidence in the financial, and thus also the economic system. 
According to Minsky and Kindleberger, financial crises most commonly start with what 
one might denote pre-crisis financial instability, where financial markets are exposed to 
disturbances ending in lost long-term sustainable equilibriums (Minsky, 1982, 1986).3 
This approach to explain the upbuilding of financial crises is often denoted as the 
instability hypothesis. Kindleberger argues that such episodes might typically evolve 
through significant exogenous macroeconomic shocks, making extended credits causing 
the economy to run faster.4 Minsky argues that endogenous factors within the system 
itself, might make financial instability evolve in times of mismatch between short-term 
and long-term sustainable equilibriums.  
 
Both agree that positive expectations and lack of financial stability may cause demand 
for credit to over expand. Thus, positive credit and asset bubbles can arise. Speculation 
in continuous growth in asset prices influence bubbles to increase further until markets 
turn due to negative shifts in expectations. The turning point is often called the “Minsky 
Moment”, since it is central in Minsky’s model explaining financial crisis. Now, expected 
losses make markets fall deeper facing crashes, credit crunches and recessions.5 Tornell 
and Westermann conclude that the financial instability approach can be applied for 
                                                     
3 Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behaviour of the 
Economy. In Charles P. Kindleberger and J. P. Laggargue (eds.), Financial Crises: Theory, History, and Policy 
(pp. 13-39). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1982), 13-39, Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an 
Unstable Economy (Yale, Yale University, 1986.   
4 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crisis (3rd ed.), (Hobokoen NJ, 
Wiley, 1996). 
5 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(3rd ed.) (Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 33-76 
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most financial crises since financial liberalization tends to cause boom-bust cycles.6 
Eichengreen finds that financial instability may cause illusive stability, defined as 
temporary financial market stability mismatching long-term sustainable stability.7 This 
coincides with the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff.8  
 
Theory 
Minsky applies a three-step financial taxonomy as a departure to explain his model. This 
implies that hedge financing, basically drawing on business surpluses and normal 
borrowing, is dominant in stable times. In times of rapid expansion and credit growth, 
speculative finance, resting on expectations of future increase in asset prices, is more 
common. Finally, Ponzi finance, which he interprets in a wide meaning, becomes more 
common when capital emissions are necessary for further growth. Monetary or credit 
expansion bring markets to overheating and asset bubbles arise or grow stronger. When 
market expectations change from positive to negative, asset prices fall, markets contract 
and go into a state of post-crisis financial instability causing the markets to contract 
more than normal correction would imply.  
 
Kindleberger’s neo-classical model is inspired by Minsky. Kindleberger starts with an 
exogenous shock, leading to monetary and credit expansion, which the financial markets 
are not able to deal with under the umbrella of financial stability. This leads to the 
creation of bubbles followed by a downward correction, which may lead to panic in 
financial markets with asset crashes, credit crunch and limitation of liquidity. On the 
way up the markets can be characterized by pre-crisis financial instability and on the 
way down with post-crisis financial instability.  
 




                                                     
6 Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Boom-Bust Cycles and Financial Liberalization (Cambridge, Mass, 
MIT Press, 2005). 
7 Barry Eichengreen, Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
8 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 












Kindleberger puts attention to financial hegemonial powers. Due to their power, size, 
standing and role, they can influence markets significantly. Thus, they are decisive for 
financial stability and instability thereby the development of financial crises.  
A Minsky-Kindleberger approach to financial crises is summed up in chart 1.  
 
Model 
Combining Minsky’s and Kindleberger’s theories with empirical research on mapping 
macroeconomic indicators relative to crisis, a study by Grytten and Hunnes ended up 
with a formal seven phases dynamic model for the development of financial crises.9 
They agree that shocks or disturbances to the economy, which the system is not able to 
handle in a consistent and relevant way, most often marks the start of the foreplay of 
crises. They define typical financial crises as evolving to go through up to seven different 
phases. However, they also conclude it is possible to skip some of these phases on the 
way to the doldrums.  
 
After the first phase of disturbance, they find that the next step is very likely to be 
overheating due to a positive shift in market expectations, which releases significant 
economic growth. Thirdly, overheating often gives pace to speculation fueled by credit 
expansion, and by that, the third phase, i.e., bubble economy. When asset markets reach 
very high values based on high lending, markets often become nervous, which is the 
fourth phase. After a period of nervousness, when the markets are very volatile, they 
will finally turn downward, which is the fifth phase. Losses on significant falls in asset 
prices leads to a crisis in financial markets, as phase six. Finally, if this crisis is deep and 
of a certain duration, it often leads to diffusion to other markets and the real economy as 
the last phase.  
 
The four first phases are mirrored in less importance of hedge financing and increasing 
importance of speculative and ponzi financing. When deficit financing evolves during the 
last four phases. At the same time the four first phases represent a period of financial 
instability creation, and the four last a period of financial instability. The model is 
summed up in chart 2. 
 
Chart 2. Seven Phases Dynamic Financial Crises Model 
 
Source, Grytten and Hunnes (2016), 51-56. 
                                                     
9 Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, Krakk & Kriser i historisk perspektiv (Oslo: Cappelen 




To investigate what patterns the crises in question followed, we use macroeconomic 
indicators, such as time series of money and credit volumes, asset prices, general prices, 
and gross domestic product. These are basically taken from the Norwegian central 
bank’s project on creating historical monetary statistics.10   
 
Method 
The paper examines to what extent there is a relationship between financial instability 
created through rapid money and credit expansion and an overheated economy with 
asset bubbles and thereafter crises, and in particular banking crises. This is basically 
done by studying deviations from polynomial trends in relevant financial and 
macroeconomic time series. Thus, structural time series analysis is used to separate 
observed time series (xt) into trend (gt), cycle (ct), seasonal (st), and irregular (it) 
components: 
 
(1) 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑔𝑡, 𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑡, 𝑖𝑡) 
 
Transformed to an arithmetic function which leads to the following equation: 
(2) 𝑥𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
It would be natural to consider it as a residual: 
(3) 𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡 – (𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡) 
 
In the present analysis it and st are seen as parts of ct. Thus, one has the two conditions: 
 
(4) it ⊆ ct   ∧   st ⊆ ct    ⇒   it + st ⊆ ct      
 
A reduced form of equation (2) will then be as in equation (5): 
(5) 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡  
 
By using a Hoderick-Prescott (HP) filter one might identify both cycle and trend, since the 
filter minimizes any variance of ct subject to a penalty for variation in the second 














                                                     
10 Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway, 
1819-2003 (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2004), Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds), 




Here (𝑥𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡) denotes the cycle component of the time series, when [(𝑔𝑡+1 −  𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 −
 𝑔𝑡−1)] denotes the difference in the growth trend from period t to t+1. The smoothing 
parameter, 𝜆, decides the smoothness of the trend component of the time series.  
One can have five estimates of the cycle component by deducting estimated trend from 
the observed time series: 
(7) 𝑐𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡  
 
To calculate relative cycles, one might use logs, more precisely natural logarithms, ln, of 
the parameters xt and gt, which implicitly gives log values of ct. 
(8) 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡) =  𝑙𝑛 (𝑥𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑡 ) 
 















where the cycle component  𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑔𝑡
∑ (𝑥𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)
2𝑇
𝑡=1  constitutes the residual. Applying this on 
equation (8) which results in relative cycles: 
 
(10) 






Smoothing parameters close to zero implies the series can be explained almost by trend 
developments only. High smoothing parameters offer trends with less fluctuations than 
low parameters. Thus, high smoothing parameters make cycles large, while low 
smoothing parameters make cycles limited.  
 
Data 
To examine the possible relationship between overexpansion and contraction in money 
and credit parameters and key macroeconomic indicators, the paper seeks to map 
booms and busts with the help of the HP-filter within nine parameters:  
 
1. Money Supply (M2) 
2. Total gross debt (C3) 
3. Bank loans (loans from all banks and similar institutions)  
4. Private bank loans (loans from private banks) 
5. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
6. Manufacturing value added (VA) 
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7. Manufacturing output 
8. Unemployment rate 
9. Bankruptcies 
 
The analysis consists of annual data due to lack of valid and reliable monthly and 
quarterly data for several series for the three first crises. Stocks are excluded due to 
significant noise from the First world war for the same three crises. 
It is considered healthy using smoothing-parameter of 𝜆 = 100, 𝜆 = 1,600, and 𝜆 = 14,400 
for annual, quarterly, and monthly figures, respectively. Since the historical data limits 
one to use annual data, the study uses 𝜆 = 100 for most parameters, except for the two 
GDP series and housing, where a 25-times higher 𝜆-value is often used. Thus, the paper 
applies 𝜆 = 2500 for these latter parameters. 
 
Results 
Testing by using these data in the structural time series model to find cycles from 
trends, one arrives at the statistical results reported in table 1. This shows that 
significant positive cycles in money supply, debt and loans arose before all the three 
banking crises. These were mirrored in booms in GDP, manufacturing production, 
manufacturing value added, and house prices, when unemployment and bankruptcies 
stood at very low levels compared to their trends. During the busts, one can see very 
clear developments in the opposite directions for all the parameters. 
 
Table 1. Cycle values of financial and key macroeconomic variables as percentages 
connected to financial crises. 
 
    Post-war crisis Monetary crisis Great Depression Nordic bank crisis 
  Lambda Early 1920s Mid-1920s 1st half 1930s 1987-1993 
    Peak Through Peak Through Peak Through Peak Through 
            
Money supply (M2) 100 22.6 -11.4 22.6 -8.8 22.6 -5.9 7.5 -5.7 
Total gross debt (C3) 100 23.2 -8.1 23.2 -6.1 23.2 -10.0 14.6 -8.8 
Bank loans 100 25.2 -8.3 25.2 -11.5 25.2 -6.6 20.2 -10.4 
Private bank loans 100 28.0 -10.9 28.0 -11.8 28.0 -8.6 20.8 -9.9 
GDP per capita 2500 6.1 -6.7 2.6 -4.8 4.2 -6.3 4.1 -4.9 
Manufacturing VA 2500 6.2 -19.1 3.5 -10.0 8.9 -12.2 5.5 -6.0 
Manufacturing output 100 4.5 -28.7 7.5 -4.5 13.8 -15.8 6,9 -3.7 
House prices 2500 23.0 -45.1 23.0 -24.7 21.6 -17.0 33.6 -35.2 
Unemployment 100 -61.6 51.6 -32.6 17.2 -21.1 23.9 -41.4 23.5 
Bankruptcies 100 -60.9 49.8 -6.2 36.4 -19.3 8.9 -40.4 41.6 
                    
 
Thus, this exercise confirms the financial instability hypothesis by Minsky and 
Kindleberger as confirmed in the seven-step dynamic financial crises model. To discuss 








In order to conclude with a higher certainty, we also analyze the data qualitatively by 
going deeper into each episode of crisis. 
 
Post-First world war crisis of the early 1920s 
The financial crisis during the early 1920s represents a typical post-war financial crisis. 
During this crisis both GDP and prices contracted. The First world war (1914-1918) saw 
international financial instability created in several aspects. Governments abandoned 
gold redemption when the war started in August 1914 to avoid an onslaught on national 
gold reserves. At the same time, central banks reduced interest rates and increased 
credit volumes. In addition, the governments overspent to meet the financial 
requirements of the war.11 Thus, there was a huge increase in product demand.  
 
Chart 3. GDP per capita in 2015 US$ (left scale) and consumer price index (CPI), 
1913=100 (right scale). 
 
Sources, Grytten, “Two centuries of economic growth”: 1-30, Grytten, “Revising price history”: 129-144. 
 
On the supply side, countries lacked raw materials due to war restrictions. Hence, they 
saw significant fall in product supply, huge increase in product demand, thus, inflation 
causing real interest rates to become strongly negative. In Norway, real interest rates 
before tax dropped to minus 30 percent in 1917, fueling lending.12 
 
Both the money stock and credit volumes increased by a multiplier of around 5 in 
Norway between 1914 until 1920.13 Consumer prices stepped up by 215%.14 Despite 
high inflation, the government was subsidizing production and consumption. 
Additionally, they introduced maximum prices and maximum profits. Consequently, a 
                                                     
11 Barry Eichengreen, Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 14-23. 
12 Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, “An anatomy of financial crisis in Norway, 1830-2010“, 
Financial History Review 21, no. 1 (2013): 25-57. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0968565013000279. 
13 Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. Klovland and Lars F. Øksendal, A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 263-300. 
14 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Revising price history: consumer price index for Norway 1492–




huge money surplus evolved. This was invested in asset markets as investment 
possibilities were limited. 
 
From the beginning of 1915 until the end of 1918, the Oslo Stock Exchange recorded an 
increase of more than three times for the aggregated stock market index, when maritime 
stocks stepped up by six times. This basically happened when GDP fell by 14.5% in 1917 
and 1918.15 During the opening of the economy after the war surplus money shifted 
from stock markets to product markets, causing a stock market crash of 76.4%.16 At the 
same time GDP per capita increased with 17.9% 1918-1920. The trade deficit reached 
25% of GDP in 1919, and inflation continued to surge. The country rapidly transitioned 
from being a net creditor to a net debtor. Its currency depreciated swiftly by 50% of its 
par value by the Autumn 1920.17  
 
Chart 4. Industrial output (left-side scale) wholesale price index  
(right-side scale), monthly figures, 1914-2014. 
 
Sources, Klovland (2013), Klovland (2015). 
 
Monetary expansion was causing overheating to the economy. The economy lost its 
momentum during the Summer of 1920, as debt problems arose.18 Demand fell, and the 
world economy went into a post-war recession.19 Central banks deemed it necessary to 
introduce deflationary monetary policy to reduce spending and deficits, hoping to stop 
inflation and currency depreciation.20 
                                                     
15 Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, Krakk & Kriser i historisk perspektiv (Oslo: Cappelen 
Damm, 2016), 175-188. 
16 Jan T. Klovland, “Historical stock price indices in Norway 1914-2003,” In Øyvind Eitrheim, Jan T. 
Klovland and Jan F. Qvigstad (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway, 1819-2003 (Oslo: Norges 
Bank, 2004), 329-348 
17 Fritz Hodne, Norwegian Economy, 1920-1980 (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 24-31. 
18 Derek Aldcroft and Steven Morevood, The European Economy Since 1914 (London: Routledge, 2013), 11-
75. 
19 Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War I: an Overview”, in Stephen 
Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 3-40. 


























Consequently, they transferred from inflationary policy during a boom to deflationary 
policy during a recession. The pro-cyclical policy contributed to transferring the boom 
into contraction, and the inflation into deflation. Industrial production fell by 47.1% 
between June 1920 and June 1921, and wholesale prices fell by 45% between October 
1920 and December 1922.21 
 
At the same time the central bank increased its key interest rate to reduce credit 
volumes. Real interest rates almost reached 40% before tax in 1921. Between 1919 and 
1921, the investment volume fell by 47%. Higher interest rates and deflation caused the 
Krone to appreciate.22 Those who had taken up loans under favorable conditions in 
1914-1920 became victims to extraordinarily high interest rates, appreciating 
currencies, and huge contractions of demand. The deflation also caused a delay in 
investments and consumption. Furthermore, the currency appreciation made 
Norwegian products more expensive compared to foreign products.  
 
In 1921 GDP per capita fell by 11%.23 Unemployment soared from 1% to 7.5% and 
foreign trade contracted by 25%.24 Bankruptcies multiplied with a factor higher than 4. 
Banks, which had increased their credits dramatically in 1914-1920, took all time high 
losses of 7% of GDP in 1923.25  
 
Monetary Crisis of the mid 1920s 
European countries, like Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom experienced a new slump in the mid-1920s. The build-up started with 
credit expansion during 1914-1920. The Parliament decided to support the banks and 
pause the deflationary policy from March 1923. Deflation temporarily turned into 
moderate inflation, the number of bankruptcies shrunk, and economic growth regained 
strength. However, several countries still struggled with foreign debts and weak 
national currencies, The Norwegian Krone depreciated to less than 50 percent of its gold 
parity until February 1924.26 The depreciation was against the monetary target. Thus, 
the central bank aimed for lower demand, deflation, and appreciation of the Krone back 
to parity. This demanded a tight monetary policy in years of stagnation.27  
                                                     
21 Jan T. Klovland, “Measuring Trends and Cycles in Industrial Production in Norway 1896-1948,” Working 
paper 18/2015 (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2015), 3-88, Jan T. Klovland, “Contributions to a history of prices in 
Norway: Monthly price indices 1777-1920,” Working paper 23/2013 (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2013), 3-201. 
22 Einar Lie, Jan T. Kobberød, Eivind Thomassen and Gjermund F. Rognved, Norges Bank 1816-2016 
(Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2016), 191-203. 
23 Ola Honningdal Grytten, Revising growth history: new estimates of GDP for Norway, 1816–2019. 
The Economic History Review. (2021) https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13085 
Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Two centuries of economic growth: Norwegian GDP 1816-2020,” Discussion 
paper 10/2020 (Bergen: Department of Economics, NHH, June 2020): 1-30. 
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.13698.71362. 
24 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “The scale of Norwegian interwar unemployment in international 
perspective,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 43, no. 2 (1995): 226-
250, htps://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1995.10415902. 
25 Sverre R. Knutsen and Einar Lie, “Financial Fragility, Growth Strategies and Banking Failures: The Major 
Norwegian Banks and the Banking Crisis, 1987-92,” Business History 44, no. 2 (2002): 88-111. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/713999267. 
26 Tore Jørgen Hanisch, “Om virkninger av paripolitikken,” Historisk tidsskrift 58, no. 3 (1979): 223-238.  
27 Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, Krakk & Kriser i historisk perspektiv (Oslo: Cappelen 




Between August 1922 and November 1923, the central bank key interest rate increased 
from 5% to 7%.28 The policy implied strongly positive real interest rates, surpassing 
30%. This made public and private debt a devastating burden.29 
 
Chart 5. Norwegian domestic credit by source in billion NOK, 1910-1940. 
 
Source, Klovland (2004) 
 
The tightening of the monetary policy paved the way for a dramatic fall in product 
demand. Debtors suffered in three fields. Firstly, a stronger currency made their loans de 
facto increase in value. Secondly, financial costs increased due to real high interest rates. 
Thirdly, demand shrunk, and thus did income. These factors combined brought about a 
substantial depression and bank crisis. Export industries suffered from the appreciation 
of the Krone, making Norwegian products more expensive to foreign products.30 The 
economy went into a negative spiral.  
 
Finally, a favorable international business cycle came to the rescue, and Norway 
obtained balance in its foreign trade due to increasing international demand. This made 
the Krone to appreciate. The market expected a return to par gold value, and from May 
1924 until the Autumn of 1925, the Norwegian currency appreciated from 50 to 78% of 
its gold parity.  
 
The negative consequences were mirrored in bank losses, again amounting to 7% of 
GDP in 1925. Unemployment almost hit 9% in 1926-1927, i.e., around eight times higher 
                                                     
28 Helge W. Nordvik, «The Banking System, Industrialization and Economic Growth in Norway, 1850-
1914,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 41, no. 1 (1993): 51-72. 
29 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Public finances, governance control and economic growth: a macroeconomic 
history approach,” Investment Management and Financial Innovations 16, no. 1 (2019): 189-202. 
doi:10.21511/imfi.16(1).2019.15 
30 Fritz Hodne, Norwegian Economy, 1920-1980 (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 27-36. 
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than during the post-war boom.31 The number of bankruptcies was almost seven times 
higher in 1926 than in 1919. Debt collection increased from 5000 to 30000.32  
 
Chart 6. Bankruptcies in Norway 1910-1930. 
 
Source, Klovland (2004). 
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s 
Despite a boom in many countries in the 1920s, there were still major structural 
problems. These were brought about by overproduction in agriculture, incipient market 
saturation of consumer durables, and imbalances in international trade, currencies, and 
debt. During the last years of the decade, Norway took part in the boom, and recorded 
growth rates around 5% in 1927-1930. Subsequently, the Great Depression hit Western 
Europe in the third quarter of 1930. The slump came in consequence of money and 
credit expansion, creating financial instability, overheating, and asset bubbles, which 
crashed in the US from the Autumn of 1929.  
 
After the First World War, Germany had to pay war reparations equivalent to 33 billion 
US Dollars. Inter-allied debts amounted to 26.5 billion US Dollars.33 Payments required a 
significant German trade surplus. However, international tariff barriers were raised. 
Additionally, both the German Mark and the British Pound were overvalued, whereas 
the American Dollar and the French Franc were undervalued. This left the US and France 
with a relative price advantage in international trade, and a corresponding disadvantage 
                                                     
31 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “The scale of Norwegian interwar unemployment in international 
perspective,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 43, no. 2 (1995): 226-
250, htps://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1995.10415902. 
32 NOS, Historical Statistics 1994, (Oslo: Statistics Norway 1995), 194. 
33 Karl Heinz Roth, “German Reparation Debts After the Second World War - A Research 
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to the UK and Germany.34 Gold accumulated in New York and Paris, and international 
liquidity was squeezed. 
 
Germany failed to fulfill her obligations, and she had to draw on short-term credits from 
American banks to pay her debt. The stock market collapse at the end of October 1929 
induced a dramatic worsening of the European debt crisis as US banks lost liquidity and 
were not able to renew their short-term credit to European banks.35  
 
Chart 7. Stock market indices Jan 1926 – Sept 1935 (Jan 1926=100). 
 
Source, League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook, (Paris: Statistical Office, League of Nations, 1927-1937) 
 
World trade contracted from 5.4 to 1.9 billion US dollars between 1929 and 1933.36 Lack 
of trust led to risk hedging by panic sales of German Marks and Austrian Schillings. The 
gold and foreign exchange reserves in Vienna and Berlin were drained, and they 
suspended free currency convertibility to gold in June 1931.37  
 
The lack of renewal of credit spread to European banks, which lost large sums in 
support positions in German and Austrian banks. On September 21, 1939, the UK 
temporarily suspended gold redemption of the Pound. The Nordic countries followed 
between September 27th and October 12th. To avoid further weakening of the Krone, 
the Norwegian central bank raised the key interest rate from 4 to 8%, and the stock 
exchange was closed for a few days.38 In March 1933, Norway joined the Sterling Area, 
pegging the Krone to Pound Sterling after a formal devaluation of 10% to the Pound. 
Thereafter, it followed the Sterling depreciating in the markets.  
                                                     
34 Barry Eichengreen, Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 239-270. 
35 Charles P Kindleberger, The World in Depression 2013 (Berkeley: University of California Press. 2013), 
217-273. 
36 Michael Graff, A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of International Economy 1820-1980: An 
Introductory Text (London: Routledge, 2015), 222-235. 
37 Marcus Nadler, "The Partial Abandonment of the Gold Standard, 1931-1932," The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 165 (1933): 202-206. Accessed December 8, 2020. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1018181. 
38 Fritz Hodne and Ola Honningdal Grytten 2002, Norsk økonomi I det 20. århundre (Bergen: 




After the Norwegian central bank suspended gold, the economy witnessed another 
shock later that year. The two largest commercial banks accounting for a third of the 
industrial companies’ credit announced large losses. They were dependent on capital 
emissions and were granted a three-month debt moratorium. 
 
The central bank followed up with credits and guarantees totaling NOK 150 million for 
the next two years for Norwegian banks. The key interest rate was reduced from 8% to 
3.5% between September 1931 and May 1933.39  
 
Chart 8. Unemployment in Norway in percent of work force 1900-1947. 
 
Source, Grytten (1995), 226-250. 
 
During the depression industrial production contracted by 22%, 40 when GDP per capita 
contracted 8.7%. External trade and investment volumes decreased by 30%.41 
Consumer prices dropped by 13%, and wholesale prices by 20%.42 In 1931 the real 
interest rate before tax approached 20%. Profitability in the private sector was negative 
as 1932 saw a record of 18 260 foreclosures. Unemployment reached new heights of 
                                                     
39 Tore J. Hanisch, “The economic crisis in Norway in the 1930s,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 
26, no. 2, (1978): 145-155, https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1978.10415624. 
40 Jan T. Klovland, “Measuring Trends and Cycles in Industrial Production in Norway 1896-1948,” Working 
paper 18/2015 (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2015), 3-88. 
41 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Two centuries of economic growth: Norwegian GDP 1816-2020,” Discussion 
paper 10/2020 (Bergen: Department of Economics, NHH, June 2020): 1-30. 
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.13698.71362. 
42 Jan T. Klovland, “Contributions to a history of prices in Norway: Monthly price indices 1777-1920,” 
Working paper 23/2013 (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2013), 3-201, Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Revising price 
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14% during the Winter of 1932-1933.43 The recession reached its bottom in December 
1932.44 The bank sector, however, struggled during the entire decade. 
 
The Scandinavian banking crisis of 1987-1993 
During 1987-1993 Norway experienced the most severe banking crisis since the inter-
war years. The crisis evolved after a wave of credit liberalization, which resulted in a 
significant boom which ended in asset market crashes, and a lagged contraction of the 
real economy.45  
 
After the Second world war (1939-1945), the governments of the Nordic countries 
aimed at low interest rates to motivate investments. In Norway, the Ministry of Finance 
was to set the interest rate level lower than the market rates. In addition, generous tax 
deductions were admitted on financial costs. This resulted in negative real interest rates 
after tax.46 They caused high demand for credits, and the economy was threatened by 
overheating, high inflation, and a weakening of the Krone. To ensure financial stability, 
the authorities introduced credit regulations.  
 
Chart 9. Monthly credit inflow (K2) in Norway in NOK billions.  
 
Sources, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank.  
        
   
Stagflation in the 1970s led to falling faith in planning solutions. From 1977 and until 
the 1990s, measures were taken to abolish credit regulations and liberalize the banking 
                                                     
43 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “The scale of Norwegian interwar unemployment in international 
perspective,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 43, no. 2 (1995): 226-
250, https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1995.10415902 
44 Jan T. Klovland, “Monetary policy and business cycles in the interwar years: The Scandinavian 
experience,” European Review of Economic History 2, no. 3 (1998): 309-
344, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1361491698000148. 
45 Anthony Saunders, and Marcia Cornett, Financial Markets and Institutions, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Irwin, 2007).   




sector. However, the Parliament did not follow a persistent policy as they chose to 
deregulate the credit market, while interest rates were still subsidized.47  
   
The mismatch resulted in instability. The combination of fixed exchange rate policy and 
free movement of capital had a similar effect. In addition to the liberalization process, 
the banks circumvented regulations by establishing additional credit and financial 
institutions. Another factor was that banks were strongly concerned with expansion 
both domestically and abroad. Furthermore, the expansionary policy in the 1970s had 
contributed to large growth in the money supply, and demand for credits increased 
strongly.48 In Norway, a growing petroleum industry and confidence in the future also 
contributed to larger demand for credit. Between the third quarters of 1982 and 1986, 
the investment volume in the mainland economy increased by 40%, while aggregate 
demand increased by 27%.49  
   
The economy entered a powerful upturn drawing on subsidized loans. Asset bubbles 
were created, financed by a credit bubble. Domestic Norwegian credits more than 
doubled between 1983 and 1987.50 The credit volume continued to increase after the 
peak in the real economy had been reached. Real estate markets showed strong growth, 
as Norwegian house prices more than tripled between 1980 and 1987. The Tokyo and 
Oslo stock exchanges nearly quadrupled from January 1983 until September 1987, when 
the Dow Jones tripled.51  The focus on expansion took place over security. Norwegian 
banks' equity ratio was reduced from 10% to 5% from 1945 to 1987.52  
   
During the credit liberalization period, banks didn’t have capacity to build control 
bodies that could provide adequate risk assessment. Combined with a race for market 
shares, this had a devastating effect.53 In addition, the fixed exchange rate system also 
caused a pro-cyclical monetary policy. One had to follow the international interest rate 
level, despite that petroleum dependence meant that Norwegian business cycles tended 
to be opposite from those abroad. Hence, Norway had to lower the interest rates in good 
times and increase them in bad times.  
   
The expansion was accompanied by high petroleum prices. In the early 1980's, oil stood 
at 40 UD dollars per barrel. During the Winter 1985-1986 oil prices plummeted to 10 US 
dollars. Falling oil prices and a foreign trade deficit caused strained liquidity. In 
response the central bank 10-folded its credits to banks.54 However, low petroleum 
                                                     
47 Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, Læring fra kriser, (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2016), 13-48. 
48 John Helliwell, “Comparative Macroeconomics of Stagflation”, Journal of Economic Literature 26, no. 1 
(1988): 1-28.  
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Economics Discussion Paper No. 10 (2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3632902 
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prices caused reduced investment activity, weakened demand, and caused 
unemployment rates climb from 1.5% in 1986 to 6% in 1993.  
   
Chart 10. Real interest rates after tax 1970-1995.  
 
Source, Norges Bank.  
   
 
During 12 days in October 1987, most western world stock markets fell by 30-45%.55 
From 1987 to 1992, real house prices in Norway fell by 43%, causing significant 
mortgage losses for the banks.56   
 
Deficits in public finances forced the government to tighten the fiscal policy. In May 
1986, the new Labour government decided to devalue 12%. It was done to ease the 
pressure on the Krone and obtain improved trade balance. To defend the new exchange 
rate, one thereafter had to bring inflation down and ensure balance in foreign trade and 
public finances.  
 
Falling inflation led to an increase in real interest rates. Additionally, a new tax reform 
was in place in 1992. Less tax deductions were admitted on debt interests. Thus, real 
interest rates after tax increased further. While one had fueled the economy during the 
boom of 1983-1986, one now stepped on the brakes during the crisis. Bank failures 
started to unfold from late 1988. During 1989-1990, the crisis become systemic 






                                                     
55 Robert J. Shiller, “Investor Behavior in the October 1987 Stock market Crash: Survey Evidence,” in 
Robert J. Shiller (ed), Market Volatility, (Boston: MIT Press, 1992). 
56 Ola Honningdal Grytten, “Boligkrakk og finanskrise i historisk perspektiv,” Samfunnsøkonomen 63, no. 4 
(2009): 39-50.  
57 Bent Vale, “The Norwegian banking crisis,” in Thorvald G, Moe, Jon A Solheim and Bent Vale (eds), The 
Norwegian Banking Crisis, (Oslo: Norges Bank, 2004), 1-22. 
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Chart 11. Bank losses as a percentage of total assets in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden  
  
 
Source, Norges Bank.  
   
In the second quarter of 1991, the commercial banks’ losses on loans and guarantees 
were recorded to 6.3%, compared to 2.8% for the savings banks.58 These were the 
largest loss provisions since the banking crisis of the 1920s.  
   
The authorities’ tightening of depreciation on losses during 1988-1991 made the banks’ 
accounting records even weaker.59 Engagements that could not be fulfilled at the time 
had to be written off in full even when banks believed the market would pick up later. It 
turned out that the depreciation rules had been very strict as Norwegian banks reversed 
significant loss provisions after 1993. Banks zeroed out their equities and had to be 
rescued by the state taking over the ownership. Since a large proportion of the 
accounted losses were reversed, this happened to be a profitable engagement for the 
state. 
   
Conclusions 
The paper examines four banking crises in the light of the financial instability hypothesis 
by Minsky and Kindleberger, refined in a new dynamic financial crisis model. The 
hypothesis suggests loss of financial stability, defined as the financial institutions’ 
solidity and the ability to provide necessary liquidity and capital in times of stressed 
markets. The crises are the Post First world war crisis in the early 1920s, the Monetary 
crisis in the mid 1920s, the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Scandinavian banking 
crisis of 1987-1993. The small open economy of Norway in international perspective is 
used as a case study. 
 
A quantitative analysis of cycles in financial and real macroeconomic key variables 
reveal that significant increase in debt during booms lead to financial instability, 
overheating and bubble tendencies. This again paved the way for the banking crises. 
                                                     
58 Sverre Knutsen and Einar Lie, “Financial Fragility, Growth Strategies and Banking Failures: The Major 
Norwegian Banks and the Banking Crisis, 1987-92,” Business History 44, no. 2 (2002): s. 88-111. 
59 Ola Honningdal Grytten, Elisabeth Bjørsvik and Yngve Nilsen, Banken i samfunnet: Bergens 
Privatbank/Bergen Bank (Bergen: Bodoni, 2013), 325-350. 
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Thereafter historical discussions of each incident confirm that loss of financial instability 
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